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The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was initiated by United States (US) President Ronald Reagan during
his first term. The idea was to develop and field an "umbrella" to protect against nuclear attack. At best,
the umbrella had holes and could be easily torn. Costs seemed exorbitant in contrast with the protection
offered. And SDI offered no protection against specific variants of attack, such as a terrorist with a
mobile nuclear device within the US. However, SDI--in various disguises--still limps along and expends
research and development dollars.
Does SDI targeting offensive biological warfare (BW) attack seem any more promising--with recent
political concerns about Iraqi and Russian BW assets? BW is a strategic threat in terms of number of
potential casualties and is conceived as a weapon of mass destruction along with chemical and nuclear
assets. And at least theoretically, the attack can come via delivery systems similar to nuclear attack.
However, SDI against BW would not only be subject to the same vulnerabilities as a nuclear SDI but
would also harbor additional ones.
SDI against BW would probably have to constitute the following: (1) ongoing intelligence gathering,
evaluation, analysis, production, and dissemination to identify threats; (2) ongoing research,
development, production, stockpiling, fielding, and dispensing of vaccines based on the perceived
threat; (3) ongoing research, development, production, stockpiling, fielding, and readying of dispensing
systems for protective equipment and antidotes based on the perceived threat; (4) information
programs to minimize the social and psychological disruption induced by the threat and employment of
BW; and (5) employment of conventional weapons and even weapons of mass destruction to destroy
adversary BW assets--if those assets are sufficiently distal to the locus of attack--based on the perceived
threat.
Intelligence. At present, a viable BW intelligence program would need significant human intelligence
resources. These resources are for the most part lacking due to language, political, social, and cultural
shortfalls. Remote sensing modes of technical intelligence are less than optimal due to the small spaces
and dual use assets sufficient for an offensive BW program. Vaccines and Antidotes. In the "spycounterspy" sequences of identifying a threat, countering it, and countering the counter, the offensive
BW side that can develop novel and unusually virulent strains of BW agents seemingly have the
advantage. Also, in an era of "downsizing," the cost of research, development, production, stockpiling,
fielding, and dispensing may be prohibitive in contrast to an existing threat until too little time remains
before the attack. Moreover, the human factors problems--especially compliance-- in implementing BW
defenses and counters are far from resolved even based on state-of-the-art social sciences. Information
Programs. As with vaccines and antidotes, state-of-the-art social sciences are not capable of handling
the psychological fallout of BW threat and attack. Most sophisticated theorists in the social scientists
seem to posit that such a capability is extremely unlikely. Destruction of BW Assets. As made clear in the
recent crisis over Iraqi BW assets, even a massive attack against BW assets would likely not be
significantly successful.
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As with the original SDI, one against BW attack initially seems reasonable but then does not survive the
onslaught of reasoned analysis. The IBPP recommendation for managing existence under the BW sword
of Damocles is to continually upgrade intelligence programs so that attempts at BW attack are nipped in
the earliest stages possible--before the point of no return. (See Altman, L.K. (March 11, 1998). Smallpox
vaccine urged to prepare for terrorist attacks. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Chairman
of the Team B Study Group. (1996). http://www.nationalsecurity.org/heritage/national
security/teamb/teambgrp.html; Preston, R. (March 9, 1998). Annals of warfare: The bioweaponeers. The
New Yorker, 52-65; SDI's 10th anniversary. http://blake.oit.unc.edu/~steph/reagan/sdi10.html; Soviet
strategic defense programs. (October, 1985). http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/ssdp.htm.)
(Keywords: Biological Agents, Bioweapons, Intelligence, SDI, Security, Strategic Defense Initiative, United
States.)
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